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Factitious disorders and
trauma-related diagnoses

BY DANIEL BROWN, PH.D.
AND ALAN W. SCREFLIN, J.D., M.A., LL.M.

The recent plethora of lawsuits involving allegations of
iatrogenically implanted memories of satanic ritual abuse and
other traumas has highlighted the existence of a unique group of
psychiatric patients. Although these patients are often successful at
deceiving therapists (and sometimes juries), the case studies in this
special issue reveal the chronic nature of their propensity to invent
traumatic identities and past histories. The core clinical features of
affect dysregulation, somatization, and impaired object relations,
together withfrequent histories of alcohol and substance abuse,
parallel the psychiatric co-morbidity frequently found in genuine
trauma victims. These case studies also point to early childhood
problems in attachment, and sometimes to real childhood trauma,
as possible etiologic factors. The current diagnostic system
does not adequately capture thefull range of these patients'
psychopathology, which involves the creation of factitious identities
and fictional traumatic personal histories. The particulars of these
histories change over time as the patients incorporate, deliberately
and/or "unconsciously," details derived from outside sources.
Although clearly susceptible to being influenced by authority
figures of all kinds, it is evident from these case studies that the
core psychopathology at work here is intrinsic to the patients and
not the by-product of therapeutic misadventure.

@ 2000 by Federal Legal Publications, Inc.
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The prevalence rates of psychological forms of factitious dis
orders and the appearance of more complex forms of psycho
logical factitious disorders have increased significantly in the
1 980s and 1 990s. Case reports of factitious illness in the
1 960s and 1 970s were mainly limited to the fabrication of
physical symptoms, and in the 1 970s and 1 980s also to the
simulation of a single psychiatric illness, such as factitious
depression. In the 1 980s and 1 990s there emerged more com
plex forms of psychological factitious illness that entail not
only the simulation of one or more psychiatric conditions
typically posttraumatic stress disorder and dissociative iden
tity dis order-but a l s o the s i mu l ation of e l aborately
fabricated personal histories and identities, including, at
times, highly exaggerated and bizarre histories such as those
involving ritual abuse. Even more recently still other new
forms have emerged, such as factitious false memory syn
drome in the context of malpractice litigation. The current
diagnostic nomenclature is inadequate in that it fails to
address these complex forms of factitious disorder; thus clini
cians and forensic experts do not have the conceptual tools
and detection skills to correctly identify complex forms of
factitious behavior typically associated with trauma-related
diagnoses. This paper was written, as were the rest of the arti
cles in this special issue of The Journal of Psychiatry & Law,
to fill that void.

1. The history of factitious disorders

Factitious disorder first appeared as a diagnosis in the third
edition of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis
orders, DSM-III, published in 1 980. A person with a facti
tious disorder voluntarily feigns symptoms of some illness in
order to derive the attention accompanying the "sick role."
Despite attempts to clarify the parameters of this rather
new diagnostic entity in the successive versions of DSM-III-R
and DSM-IV, factitious disorder patients remain "a poorly
understood group of people."1
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Modern study of factitious disorders began in 1 934 with Karl
Menninger's collection of case histories of patients suffering
from "polysurgery. addiction."2 In 1 95 1 Asher coined the term
"Munchausen's syndrome," after a German baron well known
for telling fantastic tales. Asher defined Munchausen's syn
drome as an "acute [fabricated] illness supported by a plausi
ble and dramatic history." He characterized the condition in
terms of an "intense desire to deceive everybody as much as
possible . . . based [on a] desire to be the centre of interest
and attention." According to Asher, the medical report of the
Munchausen's patient is "largely made up of falsehoods and
fantasy," and the most remarkable feature of the illness is its
senselessness."3 Bursten was the first to attempt an early clin
ical description of the disorder. Such patients embark on a
"life perpetually in search of hospitalization and instrumenta
tion." He described three major features of the condition: ( 1 )
a dramatic presentation o f one or more medical complaints;
(2) pseudologia fantastic a, or falsely elaborating symptoms
and histories; and (3) "wandering" from clinic to clinic and
from doctor to doctor. Bursten emphasized that such patients
essentially are "imposters," who defend against a sense of
inferiority by avoiding their true identity and by assuming
false roles:'
Despite these early formulations, factitious illness was rarely
diagnosed in the 1 960s. Only 12 cases of Munchausen's syn
drome were reported in the literature before 1 960, and by
1 968 the number had risen to only 36. Most of these cases
pertained to feigning medical conditions.s
In 1 968 Spiro reviewed 38 cases of factitious illness. He saw
Munchausen's syndrome as a specific type of factitious ill
ness characterized by a chronic, unremitting course over
time. Spiro emphasized that despite their fabrication of
largely medical symptoms, these patients are best given a pri
mary psychiatric diagnosis.6 Other clinicians since Spiro have
likewise emphasized the psychiatric nature of this condition. '

HeinOnline -- 27 J. Psychiatry & L. 375 1999

376

FACTITIOUS DISORDERS & TRAUMA-RELATED DIAGNOSES

The number of case reports of factitious illness increased in
the 1 970s and 1 980s. Reich and Gottfried described case
reports of 41 factitious patients seen at a B oston hospital
from between 1 970 and 1 980.S Folks and Freeman reported
on 28 cases seen between 1 980 and 1 985.9 Prevalence rates
for the condition have been estimated at 0 . 2 %-0. 8 % of
patients, with estimates of up to 1 0% for factitious fever
reports. 10
The types of medical illnesses feigned by factitious disorder
patients are as diverse as the disease itself,1I and it is conceiv
able that factitious behavior can occur for almost any physio
logical system in the body.12 Some attempts have been made
to categorize factitious medical manifestations into subtypes,
such as self-induced infections, simulated medical illnesses,
chronic wounds, and surreptitious self-medication.13 More
recen tly, factitious cancerl4 and factitious AIDSIS have
become more popular.
Historically, it remains true that the majority of traditional
cases of factitious illness pertain to feigning medical condi
tions.1 6 However, the past several decades have been charac
terized by a remarkable increase in factitious psychiatric
conditions. 17 Here again, the possible psychiatric manifesta
tions of factitious illness are so diverse that they are hard
to classify. Common forms of factitious psychiatric illness
reported in the literature included factitious depression and
grief;ls factitious psychosis and schizophrenia;19 factitious neu
rological conditions, e.g., epilepsy;20 and feigned aIcoholism.21
The classification of factitious disorders gets even more com
plicated due to reports of a co-existence of factitious physical
and psychological symptoms22 and also because of the co
existence of factitious and genuine psychiatric conditions,
typically eating disorders and alcoholism, in the s ame
patient.23 A history of chemical dependency is strongly asso
ciated with the subsequent development of a factitious condi
tion.24
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2. Clinical features of factitious disorder

A factitious disorder is best defined as an "artificial produc
tion or simulation of a disease [or history] ."25 Like malinger
ing, factitious behavior involves deliberate deception and
often intentional self-harm.26 Symptoms are dramatically pre
sented, and the production of symptoms and/or histories is
exaggerated when the patient is being observed. According to
Folks and Freeman, the three essential clinical features
include pathological lying, recurrent simulated illnesses, and
wandering from clinic to clinic assuming a sick role. Support
ing evidence includes borderline or antisocial personality
traits, childhood deprivation, equivocal results from diverse
diagnostic and treatment procedures, evidence of self-induced
symptoms, knowledge of the medical field, multiple hospital
izations, mUltiple scars, a police record, and a dramatic pre
sentation.27
Similarly, Ireland et al. described the essential clinical fea
tures as simulated dramatic illness; spurious signs of disease
produced by self-mutilation or drug abuse; mUltiple hospital
izations; pathological lying; aggressive, disruptive, or evasive
behavior; and premature discharge against medical advice.28
Multiple patient identities in the same patient over time are
quite common,2 9 as is a chronic unremitting course.30
Some experts have described a continuum of simulating dis
orders. Cramer et aI., for example, see malingering, factitious
disorder and s omatoform disorder along a continuum . 3)
Nadelson, likewise, has described a continuum of simulation,
ranging from abnormal illness behavior (malingering and fac
titious behavior), somatization, conversion disorders, psy
chogenic pain disorder, hypochondriasis, and patients with
"real" illnesses.32
Dworkin and Caligor describe a three-dimensional model
used to distinguish a factitious disorder from related condi
tions: symptoms (physical vs. psychological); production of
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symptoms (voluntary vs. involuntary); and motivation (con
s cious vs. unconscious) . Unlike malingering, factitious
behavior is characterized by unconsciously motivated behav
ior, and unlike somatization disorder, factitious behavior is
characterized by voluntary production of symptoms. 33
Furthermore, patients engaging in factitious behavior can do
so at different "levels of enactment." At the lower level the
patient simply reports false symptoms. At an intermediate
level the report is accompanied by simulation behavior. At
the higher level of enactment the patient actually creates the
illness through self-inflicted, symptom-producing behaviors.34
Most experts agree that the basic motivation associated with
factitious illness is the compulsive need to assume a sick role
in order to get attention or care-taking. In fact, "this goal of
obtaining care differentiates factitious illness from other self
destructive behaviors." 35 However, patients may also engage
in factitious behavior to avoid responsibility and to deflect
from disappointments in life.36
One unresolved issue is the extent to which factitious behav
ior is voluntary or involuntary. Most experts agree that the
simulation of symptoms and/or fabrication of a history is vol
untary behavior, while the motivation to adopt a sick role is
largely involuntary. While the creation of fabricated symp
toms may be voluntary, and the patient is aware of producing
false symptoms, the patient actively tries to keep such simu
lation a secret. However, since factitious behavior essentially
is deception, it can entail self-deception in addition to other
deception, so that such behavior, although voluntarily pro
duced, nevertheless may not be fully in awareness. Further
more, it is not always easy to differentiate between conscious
and unconscious production and motivationY
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3. Refining the factitious disorder diagnosis
"hysteria split asunder"

The concept of a factitious disorder diagnosis came from a
classic paper titled "Hysteria Split Asunder" published in
1 978, just before DSM-III replaced the previous DSM-II.38 In
that paper Hyler and Spitzer made the point that the DSM-II
concept of "hysteria," much like the idea of "insanity," was
over-inclusive, diagnostically imprecise, and difficult to test
empirically. They believed that "hysteria" could be divided
conceptually into a variety of discrete subgroups, and that
well-defined criteria could be established for each of these
unique diagnostic entities. In essence, "hysteria" was split
into four individual categories and then eliminated as a
generic category from DSM-III: histrionic personality disor
der (Axis II); somatoform disorders (Axis I); dissociative dis
orders (Axis I); and factitious disorder (Axis I). According to
this new classification, conversion disorder became a subtype
of the generic somatoform disorders category, and somato
form and dissociative disorders were separated from each
other, the former pertaining to physical symptoms and the lat
ter to mental symptoms (with respect to consciousness, iden
tity and memory) . Factitious disorders were differentiated
from somatoform disorders based on the voluntary produc
tion of physical symptoms in the former group as compared
with an involuntary report of physical symptoms in the latter
group. Like malingering, factitious disorders are voluntarily
produced forms of deception. Unlike malingering, factitious
disorders are not obviously linked to environmental goals,
such as monetary gain.
In this new system, factitious disorder appeared as a genuinely
new diagnosis. The basic idea was to delineate the dissimu
lating feature of hysteria as a separate diagnostic entity in its
own right.39 With this new factitious disorder diagnosis, the
idea that certain patients might engage in systematic, planned
deception of their doctors, not for monetary gain but for purely
psychological reasons, reached a new level of legitimacy.
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4. Factitious disorder in the editions of the DSM
DSM-III (1 980) was the first edition of the DSM to include

the diagnosis of factitious disorder as a new type of dissimu
lating disorder. According to the DSM-III, the following cri
teria are used for a factitious disorder:
A.

Plausible presentation of physical symptoms that are appar
ently under the individual's voluntary control to such a
degree that there are multiple hospitalizations.

B.

The individual's goal is apparently to assume the "patient"
role and is not otherwise understandable in light of the indi
vidual's environmental circumstances.40

These criteria emphasize the voluntary production of symp
toms, motivated by a desire to assume the sick role. The
caveat "not otherwise understandable in light of the individ
ual's environmental circumstances" was meant to underscore
the importance of differentiating between malingering and
factitious behavior. DSM-III also explicitly defines Mun
chausen's syndrome as a chronic form of a factitious disorder
pertaining mainly to physical symptoms.
One of the striking features of these DSM-III criteria is that
little emphasis is given to factitious psychological conditions
(or to atypical forms of factitious disorder). Although DSM
III sets up a separate category for psychological factitious
symptoms, such symptoms are considered quite rare (e.g.,
Ganser's syndrome).41
Several years later the DSM-IIIR defined the criteria for facti
tious disorder in the following manner:
A.

Intentional production or feigning of physical [or psychologi
cal] symptoms.

B.

A psychological need to assume the sick role, as evidenced by
the absence of external incentives for the behavior, such as
economic gain, better care, or physical well-being.

C.

Occurrence not exclusively during the course of another Axis
I disorder, such as schizophrenia.42
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Thus several modifications appear i n the DSM-IIIR that are
not found in the original 1 980 criteria. In the DSM-IIIR, the
meaning of "voluntary control" is more carefully defined as
"deliberate and purposeful (intentional)," but not necessarily
under the patient's control. Such control may be deliberate
but also "have a compulsive quality."43 The DSM-IIIR also
makes more explicit the lack of external incentives operative
in factitious behavior, as compared with malingering. A facti
tious disorder differs from malingering on the basis of an
intrapsychic need. Because many more cases of factitious
psychological symptoms had been reported in the literature in
the early 1 980s, DSM-IIIR also keeps the DSM demarcation
between factitious physical and factitious psychological
symptoms, but it gives greater definition to the boundaries
between each of these categories.44
The exclusionary rules of these DSM-IIIR criteria are very
interesting. Generally speaking, a factitious disorder diagno
sis is not given if another (real) Axis I psychiatric condition
is present (e.g., C. "Occurrence not exclusively during the
course of another Axis I disorder, such as schizophrenia." But
see elsewhere, "The presence of factitious physical or psy
chological symptoms does not preclude the coexistence of
true physical or psychological symptoms").4S Thus the diag
nosis of a factitious disorder is made very conservatively in
the presence of a real Axis I psychiatric condition, and DSM
IIIR clearly downplays the possibility of co-existing facti
tious behavior and a real Axis I condition. However, a
factitious disorder diagnosis is not made exclusive of an Axis
II diagnosis or of substance abuse, so that it clearly is possi
ble to have factitious behavior co-existing with a personality
disorder diagnosis under DSM-IIIR definitions.
The DSM-IV currently defines a factitious disorder a s
follows:
A.

Intentional production or feigning of physical or psychologi
cal signs or symptoms.
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B.

The motivation for the behavior is a psychological need to
assume the sick role.

C.

An absence of external incentives . . . the behavior is not
better accounted for by another Axis I or Axis II disorder
(e.g., not in response to command hallucinations, not a conse
quence of a suicide attempt).46

The distinction between factitious disorders with predomi
nantly physical symptoms and those with predominantly psy
chological signs and symptoms is preserved from DSM-lIIR.
However, DSM-IIIR uses separate criteria for factitious disor
der with physical symptoms and for factitious disorder with
psychological symptoms. DSM-IVuses a single generic set of
criteria for factitious disorder, and it lists physical, psycho
logical, and mixed factitious forms as sUbtypes.47 This repre
sents a conceptual improvement, in that use of the current
criteria contains an appreciation that factitiousness can take a
variety of forms. DSM-IValso contains a "parsimony clause"
in that a factitious disorder diagnosis is not recommended if
the symptoms can be accounted for by another Axis I or Axis
II disorder.48 Unfortunately this type of thinking, as we will
see later, makes it difficult to detect cases in which factitious
behavior co-exists with genuine psychiatric illnesses.
Another important change in DSM-IV is the recommendation
of a new type of factitious disorder not otherwise specified,
factitious disorder by proxy, the details of which are included
in a list of empirically derived research diagnostic criteria.49
In the international diagnostic nomenclature, ICD-lO, facti
tious disorders are included under Section F6, Disorders of
Adult Personality and Behavior:
FD F68.1 Intentional production or feigning of symptoms or dis
abilities either physical or psychological (factitious disorder).
A.

A persistent pattern of intentional production or feigning of
symptoms andlor self-infliction of wounds in order to produce
symptoms in the absence of a confirmed physical or mental
disorder.
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B.

No evidence can be found for an external motivation (such as
financial compensations, escape from danger, more medical
care, etc.). If such evidence can be found, category Z (malin
gering) should be used. (World Health Organization, 1990, p.

368)50

While fCD-fO maintains the basic notion of factitiousness as
a simulation disorder as found in the DSM classifications, it
does not include anything about assuming a sick role, and it
rejects the idea of an unconscious motivation. Furthermore,
factitious disorders as defined by the fCD-fO are much more
closely aligned to personality disorders than in the DSM
interpretation.

5. Diagnostic criticism

While the basic intention of creating a new DSM diagnosis of
factitious disorder so as to delineate a disease of deliberate
deception based on psychological needs is admirable, the
enterprise has been somewhat ill conceived. Well-designed
systematic field trials of the new diagnosis have not yet been
conducted, and most of the published literature on the disor
der still consists mainly of case reports.51 Interrater reliability
of the diagnosis (kappa coefficients) remain unacceptably
low-lower than most other DSM diagnoses.52 In part, the
problem stems from the fact that the conceptual basis for the
disorder and its specific diagnostic criteria are not very
clearly delineated. According to critics, "the rationale that
underlies and informs the diagnostic criteria for factitious
disorder is, at present, logically indefensible and empirically
unfounded."53 A number of problems with the diagnostic cat
egory have been identified.
a. The
problem of
establishing
motivation

Ultimately the clinician has to make a subjective judgment
about whether the deceptive behavior is voluntary or involun
tary, and whether or not it is motivated by an unconscious
need to assume a sick role. According to Rogers et al.:
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Motivation (conscious or unconscious, voluntary or involuntary) is
the determining factor in the diagnosis of factitious disorder with
psychological symptoms. . . .
Furthermore, the voluntary aspect of its clinical presentation, the
pivotal aspect of factitious disorder, remains unresolved and contro
versial.54

Many experts concur that making such a determination is not
always easy or always possible.55 Utilization of countertrans
ference reactions is not a reliable way to make the diagno
sis.5 6 The problem is further complicated by the fact that
simulation behavior in a given factitious disorder patient may
arise from very diverse and conflicting motives within the
same patient.57 Based on the unreliability of such subjective
judgments, some experts have recommended that the clini
cian sidestep the determination of motivation entirely and
make the diagnosis based on the deceptively produced signs
and symptoms alone:
Therefore, an appropriate strategy might be to set aside the slippery
question of what is conscious and what is voluntary, and concen
trate on the objective features of patients displaying factitious signs
or symptoms.58

Irrespective of the determination of voluntary/involuntary
and conscious/unconscious motivation, the bottom line
remains: a systematic pattern of deceptively produced symp
toms and/or history.
b. The
problem of
diagnostic
boundaries
exclusion,
inclusion,
overlap &
co-existing
conditions

Rogers et al. have criticized the lack of conceptual clarity
with respect to exclusion and inclusion criteria in making a
factitious disorder diagnosis. They believe this diagnosis
"does not appear to satisfy the requirements for a mental dis
order of inclusion, exclusion, and outcome criteria." They
further point out that many patients with factitious behavior
have concurrent real Axis I psychiatric conditions, and that
patients with Axis II diagnoses, notably borderlines, can cer
t ainly rival a purely factitious disorder patient in the variabil
ity and simulation o f sympt o m s . Furt h ermore, other
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syndromes exist that also entail deliberately produced symp
toms such as nail-biting, cuticle-picking, h air-pulling,
anorexia or bulimia, and self-mutilation. S ome question
remains as to how such conditions are and are not similar to a
factitious disorder.5 9 According to Rogers et aI., such overlap
with other conditions "calls into question the soundness of
diagnosing factitious disorder in the presence of such a disor
der [like borderline]." 60
On the other hand, many experts have avoided the issue of
diagnostic overlap altogether; they make the diagnosis of fac
titious disorder only in the absence of any other real psychi
atric condition. Certainly this approach is given support by
the passage in the DSM-IIIR that states that "occurrence not
exclusively during the course of another Axis I disorder, such
as schizophrenia."61 Supporting this view, Sutherland and
Rodin emphasize that the diagnosis of factitious disorder "is
often a diagnosis of exclusion." 62
An additional complication is the variability and heterogene
ity within the domain of patients diagnosed with a factitious
disorderY For example, DSM-IIIR and DSM-IV arbitrarily
divide factitious disorders into three subcategories: physical,
psychological, and not otherwise specified. The problem with
adopting such categories is that many contemporary factitious
disorder patients present with both psychological and physi
cal symptoms.64 Not only has there been a recent remarkable
increase in factitious disorder patients with psychological
symptoms and mixed physical and psychological symptoms,
but there has also been a significant increase in factitiously
produced false histories and identities, both associated with,
and in the absence of, factitious symptoms. Such complex
factitious presentations help us to appreciate the many faces
of the disorder, the common core of which entails the need to
deceive in some way or another.
Another problem is the diagnostic overlap with other dissim
ulating and hysteria-related conditions such as malingering,
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somatoform disorders, and dissociative conditions. Somato
form conditions can sometimes co-exist with malingering.
Sometimes the only clear distinction between a somatoform
disorder and factitiousness is the "sociopathic pattern" of
deception in the factitious disorder patient. 6s As we will see
later in this paper, the co-existence of a factitious disorder
and a dissociative disorder is increasingly common.
The factitious disorder patient who has deceived clinicians
for years may eventually sue a clinician for malpractice.
When such potential monetary gains enter into the equation
of systematic deceptive behavior, factitiousness and malin
gering overlap.
The problem of the overlap between a factitious disorder and
other Axis I and Axis II conditions has yet to be resolved
adequately, and making the factitious disorder diagnosis at
the exclusion of real Axis I conditions ignores the clinical
observation that factitious behavior frequently is observed in
association with other Axis I and Axis II conditions. The co
existence of factitious disorder and bipolar disorder has been
documented.66 The co-existence of factitious behavior and an
Axis II personality disorder is extremely well documented
across many studies, so much so that some experts have
advocated that factitious behavior should be seen as a subset
of borderline personality or a mixed personality disorder.67
The most common types of personality disorders associated
with a factitious disorder diagnosis are borderline, narcissis
tic, histrionic, and antisocial personality disorder.6 8 There is
also a strong association between factitious behavior and sub
stance abuse and dependency.69
The relationship between factitious disorder and major disso
ciative disorders has not been clarified. While the DSM-lIIR
and the DSM-IV at least acknowledged the often clinically
observed association between factitious disorder and person
ality disorder and substance abuse, DSM-IVfailed to clarify
the interrelationship between factitious disorder and dissocia-
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tive disorder. As Freyberger and Schneider said, "The phe
nomenological and etiological relationship between factitious
disorder and borderline, acute transient and atypical psy
chotic disorders, and dissociative states have to be included
in the . . . diagnostic systems."70
c. Fusing
hysteria back
together
versus
diagnosing
co-morbidity

Hyler and Spitzer's project of "splitting hysteria asunder"
was admirable in its goal of seeking greater conceptual clar
ity, empirical reliability and validity for each of the four diag
nostic entities into which hysteria was split. The problem
with this enterprise, however, is that it virtually ignores the
natural covariance between each of the four diagnostic enti
ties. Given the increasing number of case reports and empiri
cal studie s that show an association between factitious
disorder on the one hand and various personality disorders
(such as borderline and histrionic personality), somatoform
disorders, and dissociative disorders on the other hand, the
interrelationship between these conditions, at least for certain
patients, cannot be ignored.
Kihlstrom's radical proposal to return to the archaic diagnosis
of hysteria views the attempt to split hysteria asunder as a
failure.71 However, fusing hysteria back together does not
adequately address the problems that necessitated the split in
the first place. Our more moderate proposal is that these four
diagnostic entities remain as discrete entities, but that diag
nosticians and clinical researchers more adequately address
the degree to which these diagnoses co-vary, at least for cer
tain patients. In other words, the DSM criteria should be
redrafted to allow explicitly for the fact that a factitious dis
order may co-exist with a major dissociative disorder, a
somatoform disorder, and a personality disorder, and in at
least some patients two, three, or all four of these conditions
may occur as multiple co-morbid diagnoses. Multiple co
morbid diagnoses of this nature are not uncommon in clinical
reality, and we believe that the co-morbidity position is a bet
ter solution than Kihlstrom's fusion position or the DSM's
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exclusion position ("occurrence not exclusively during the
course of another Axis I disorder, such as schizophrenia.")72

d. Abnormal
illness
behavior

Another reasonable s olution to the problem of o verlap
between factitious, personality, somatoform and dissociative
disorders is to drop the diagnosis of factitious disorder as a
discrete diagnostiC entity per se and, instead, to view facti
tiousness as a type of "abnormal illness behavior" that may
co-exist with many types of genuine psychiatric disorders.
Pilowsky coined the term abnormal illness behavior (AlB),
in which the primary motivation is to adopt a sick role.
Pilowsky observed that some patients manifest illness behav
ior in the absence of physical signs of illness or any sense of
pain or discomfort. Abnormal illness behavior occurs when
the "sick role is not appropriate to the objective pathology
observed."73 Carodoc-Davies stated succinctly: "More logi
cally, these conditions can be viewed as dysfunctional behav
iors, not nosological entities."74 Rogers et aI. take a similar
position: "Questions remain as to whether factitious disorder
with psychological symptoms is more of a symptom/syndrome
than a disorder."7S Other experts have viewed factitiousness
not as a discrete diagnostic entity, but as a form of illness
behavior strongly associated with a personality disorder.7 6
Our position is that factitious illness behavior is definitely
seen in some personality-disordered patients, but is not so
limited. Factitious illness behavior can also sometimes be
found in association with somatoform and dissociative disor
ders. One way to handle this interrelationship is to give a
diagnosis of a somatoform disorder with factitious features or
a dissociative disorder with factitious features. Whether pref
erence is given to making joint co-morbid diagnoses or to an
Axis I diagnosis with factitious illness behavior features, in
either case the fundamental interrelationship between these
hysterialike diagnoses and factitious behavior is preserved.
Furthermore, in each case the primary motivation of simula
tion or embellishment of a genuine Axis I disorder in the ser
vice of care-eliciting behavior is emphasized.77
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6. Factitious trauma-related illness behavior
a. Factitious
posttraumatic
stress
disorder

As the diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
became popularized in the era following the Vietnam War, a
new version of factitious behavior emerged in the 1 980s: fac
titious PTSD. Sparr and Pankratz reported five cases of indi
viduals alleging that they had PTSD as a result of combat
exposure in Vietnam. Three claimed to have been prisoners of
war. All five reported fabricated war stories along with simu
lated posttraumatic stress symptoms. Eventually their decep
tion was discovered; four of the five patients had never been
in Vietnam, and two had never been in the military at all.
Sparr and Pankratz concluded, "Factitious posttraumatic
stress disorder is yet another variation of the many clinical
deceptions that physicians may encounter." Each patient had
been "fairly convincing" to the doctors, yet "blatantly mis
represented the facts."78 Some years later these same authors
described three additional case s . They concluded that
"factitious PTSD has not disappeared over time."79 Lynn
and B elza similarly reported seven cases of factitious
PTSD in the wake of media coverage of PTSD. While the
traditional factitious disorder patient with physical symptoms
engages in simulation behavior out of a need to adopt a
"sick role," Lynn and B elza emphasize that the individual
with factitious PTSD does so out of a need to achieve a
warrior or hero status. They conclude that factitious PTSD
is "not uncommon" as a consequence of the Vietnam conflict.
They emphasize that such an individual "had obviously
acquired sufficient knowledge of PTSD to develop a tale
best suited to his needs. The motives, however, varied in
each case. "8 0 Currently, these findings are not infrequent,
and similar cases have appeared in the 1 990s.81 As other
international conflicts have received wide media exposure,
new versions of factitious PTSD have also been reported,
such as the factitious presentation of trauma following a fab
ricated account of an IRA bombing in Northern Ireland. Once
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again the primary motivation was to get attention as a war
hero.82
An important feature of factitious PTSD is the total fabrica
tion of a fictitious trauma story in addition to the more tradi
tional simulation of psychologi c al symptoms of a
trauma-related disorder. Such cases make it clear that simula
tion behavior is not at all restricted to faking symptoms of a
disorder, and that faking a personal history and identity is
equally important.
b. Factitious
victimization:
fabrication of
personal
history

Feldman, Ford and Stone state:
Although patients with factitious disorders typically seek the
"patient" role through illness portrayals, some instead portray them
selves falsely as "victims." [Victim status was achieved through
fabricated rape reports.] Yet none of the allegations was clearly dis
proved.83

This citation illustrates a growing awareness that some indi
viduals fabricate a personal history of victimization more
than they fabricate symptoms, although such reports are often
accompanied by simulated rape-related symptoms. Feldman
et al. also note that patients most likely to develop false
reports of childhood abuse, rape, or other trauma have a "pre
disposition to dissociation."84
Other detailed case accounts of factitious rape have been
reported in the literature. One patient with a borderline per
sonality disorder diagnosis alleged two separate incidents of
fabricated rape along with the complaint that she could not
remember many details of the rapes. She later confessed to
fabricating the rape stories while undergoing a polygraph
test. In retrospect it became clear that she made up the rapes
in order to get attention from her doctor. "[S]he chose to meet
her emotional needs by seeking a close therapeutic relation
ship with a physician who she felt would trust and not ques
tion her."85
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In a recent case report, a woman made a highly dramatic false
allegation of a violent sexual assault. Later it became clear
that she had self-inflicted her wounds.86 Other cases of facti
tious rape follow a similar trajectory.87 After presenting four
cases of factitious rape, Feldman et al. concluded that each
was "prompted by a search for nurturance."88
Factitious victimization is not restricted to rape reports, but
covers the entire gamut of trauma and abuse (for example,
see the cases described by Marmer in this issue). Fabricated
accounts of neglect and physical abuse have been reported.89
False allegations of physical assault by a parent90 and fabri
cated reports of being an adult survivor of childhood sexual
abuse have also appeared in the literature.91 Sometimes these
stories are extensive and bizarre in nature. For example,
Stone described a case of a young woman with "unverifiable
stories of a horrendous and constantly changing content. "92
Coons and Grier described a 25-year-old woman with a fabri
cated history of S atanic ritual abuse.93 Factitious sexual
harassment claims h ave also been studied. Although n o
objective evidence existed to verify the harassment charge,
these patients nevertheless felt victimized, and they were
"motivated to file factitious sexual harassment claims by a
need for external validation of their inner experiences."94
Factitious bereavement has also been reported-for example,
the fabricated loss of a fictitious twin, resulting in hospital
ization.95
The early literature on factitious behavior primarily pertained
to factitious physical symptoms. Only later did mental health
professionals come to appreciate the range of factitious psy
chiatric conditions. Nevertheless, the DSM definition clearly
p l aces its emp h asis on factitious symptom production,
whether the symptoms are of a physical or a psychological
nature. The DSM definition does not give proper emphasis to
the range of factitious victim reports and personal histories,
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irrespective of whether or not they are accompanied by simu
lated symptoms.
Conceptually, the seeds of understanding factitious victimiza
tion are found in Bursten's term "pseudologia fantastica" dat
ing back to the 1 950s.96 Yet DSM-III and subsequent editions
never picked up on this theme sufficiently to develop a cate
gory of factitious personal history in general or of factitious
victimization in particular. Therefore most clinicians today
have not been provided with the appropriate conceptual tools
to detect factitious victim reports unless they are accompa
nied by increasingly bizarre and inconsistent symptoms over
time. The underlying motivation of factitious victimization is
less about the adoption of a sick role and more about "the
wish to acquire victim status."97
We believe the prevalence of factitious victimization is
higher than is represented by the few scattered case reports in
the literature. For example, textbooks frequently report the
well-known phenomenon of false confessions after maj or
crimes have been reported/8 and the topic is discussed in
Scheflin and Brown (this issue). There is increasing evidence
that a significant portion of the variance of contemporary
"false memory" cases are manifestations of factitious behav
ior. False-memory recanters typically recover progressively
complex and sometimes bizarre abuse and ritual abuse mem
ories in the context of psychotherapy. Sometime later they
retract the abuse reports as fabrications and sue the therapist
for malpractice. In these lawsuits they allege that the thera
pist suggestively implanted false abuse memories. High, in
this issue, makes the point that the currently dominant expla
nation for retracted childhood abuse reports previously
reported by adults in psychotherapy is the iatrogenic hypoth
esis: that the allegedly false childhood abuse reports were
"implanted" through unduly suggestive therapeutic influ
ences. He shows that a plausible alternative explanation for at
least a portion of these recanted stories is that both the
embellished abuse report to the therapist and the embellished
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recanted report to attorneys are a form of factitious behavior.
This behavior is motivated by a need for attention-first from
the defendant therapist and then from the plaintiff attorney
and the court. This thesis has historical support.99 Marmer
(this issue) presents several case studies in which factitious
disorder and malingering co-existed within the same patients.
He demonstrates that the traditional distinction between facti
tious disorder and malingering, in terms of primary and sec
ondary gain, isn't that clear-cut, and that some p atients
fabricate symptoms and trauma stories out of both a need for
attention and a wish for financial gain from lawsuits.
c. Factitious
dissociative
identity
disorder and
other
dissociative
conditions

Factitious amnesia, often associated with a variety of neuro
logical and physical complaints, has been reported.1oo Facti
tious presentation of a major dissociative disorder, such as
dissociative identity disorder (DID) and dissociative disorder
not otherwise specified (DDNOS), has also been discussed
recently. Coons was the first to describe cases of factitious
DID. In 1 978 he observed that some hospitalized psychiatric
inpatients who had not been diagnosed with MPD developed
MPD-like symptoms after exposure to genuine MPD patients
on the unit. He called this phenomenon "pseudomultiplic
ity."101 In 1 9 87 Kluft described six cases of likely simulated
MPD associated with criminal proceedings. He compared
these with 46 genuine MPD cases according to a set of malin
gering criteria. He found that all 46 genuine MPD patients
shared two or more indicators of malingering with the likely
malingered MPD cases, so that traditional indicators of
malingering did not adequately discriminate between genuine
and malingered MPD. However, clinical criteria could be
used to distinguish between the two groups because those
with malingered MPD symptoms produced stereotyped, exag
gerated, and inconsistent alter behavior over time as com
pared with genuine MPD patients. The malingered MPD
symptoms were not convincing, and such patients showed no
prior history of dividedness.I02 In 1991 Chu observed:
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With the increasing availability of information concerning MPD in
the media, in the scientific literature, and through patient networks
and self-help groups, the possibility and incidence of deliberate
simulation of MPD is increasing. Although this problem appears to
be more frequent in malingering, i.e., in a forensic setting where the
motivation is obvious, it is also appearing in the non-forensic clini
cal setting as a factitious disorder.103

He added, "The deliberate and realistic simulation of MPD
over a brief period of time is not difficult."I04 However, clini
cal detection of faked MPD is at times difficult, especially
because of the overlap between genuine and simulated MPD
on malingering indices. Chu discussed two cases, the first of
a "relatively obvious" case of malingered MPD in the context
of legal proceedings, and the second of factitious MPD that
required "an extended period of evaluation prior to accurate
diagnosis [of factitious MPD]."I05 Chu's discussion illustrates
two important points: ( 1 ) Factitious MPD in the clinical set
ting is far more difficult to detect than malingered MPD in
the legal arena; (2) Between the time of Kluft's 1 987 obser
vations and Chu's 1991 observations, "patients with factitious
MPD had become considerably more sophisticated in their
simulation of MPD symptomotology; thus, the differentiation
from genuine MPD was much more difficult and time con
suming."I06
Coons and Milstein 1 07 conducted the first scientific study
comparing genuine and simulated MPD. They reviewed data
on 1 12 patients consecutively admitted to a psychiatric inpa
tient hospital specializing in the treatment of dissociative dis
orders. They found that 1 0 1 had been diagnosed with genuine
MPD and another 1 1 ( 1 0%) were found to have either facti
tious or malingered MPD. These 1 1 simulating MPD patients
were compared with 50 genuine MPD patients along a num
ber of dimensions such as demographics, response to psycho
logical testing, and clinical features. Although simulating and
genuine MPD patients did not differ statistically in most
demographic variables or psychological testing, or in the
presence of many clinical features typically associated with
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MPD (such as the presence of alters, inter-alter dialogues,
amnestic barriers, disremembered experiences, changes in
handwriting and abilities, and reports of physical and sexual
abuse), there were two essential differences. First, w ith
respect to dissociative features, the simulators showed signif
icantly fewer mood alterations and manifested depressed and
angry alter personality behavior significantly less than gen
uine MPD patients. The genuine MPD patients manifested
sexual desire disorders significantly more frequently than did
the simulators. The simulators also showed more symptoms
associated with personality disorders--e.g., substance abuse,
self-mutilation, suicidality, and somatization-than did the
genuine MPD patients. Co-consciousness between alters was
significantly less likely in simulated MPD patients as com
pared with genuine MPD patients. Second, those with facti
tious or malingered MPD had significantly more features
characteristic of simulation disorders than did the genuine
MPD patients:
Of the eight symptoms or behaviors characteristic of factitious dis
order or malingering which were inquired about in the original
study (la belle indifference, exaggeration, persistent lying, pseu
dologia fantastica, selective amnesia, lack of consistent w ork
history, refusal of collateral interviews, legal problems, and exces
sively dramatic behavior), all were increased and significantly dif
ferent from the patients with genuine MPD .
. Lack of prior
dissociation, seeking hospitalization and MPD diagnoses appeared
in all of the simulators. Inconsistent symptom presentations and
worsening of symptoms while under observation also characterized
the simulator groUp.IOS
.

.

It is interesting to note that there were no significant differ
ences between s imulating and genuine MPD patients in
reports of physical and sexual abuse histories. Qualitatively,
these histories were typically much more dramatically pre
sented and exaggerated by the simulators than by the genuine
MPD patients, and the simulators were likely to refuse collat
eral interviews that might have exposed the simulation.
Coons and Milstein emphasize that the kind of factitious
MPD seen in the early 1 990s was much more difficult to
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detect than the more obvious reported cases of malingered
MPD reported by Kluft in the 1 980s:
Although some simulated cases of MPD may be quite obvious,
other cases may be extremely difficult to discern, even for an expe
rienced clinician. . . . The clinician must look, rather, for the signs
characteristic of factitious disorder or malingering. These include
chronic severe disability since late adolescence, lack of a consistent
work history, dramatic and exaggerated presentation of symptoms,
pseudologia fantastica, demanding and deprecating attitudes
towards health care providers, refusal of collateral examinations,
selective amnesia, and hospital seeking behavior, and in the case of
factitious disorder, a psychological need to assume the sick role.I09

In an earlier paper, Coons and Grier elaborate on the concept
of factitious victimization. Through a single case study they
illustrate the factitious presentation of a Satanic ritual abuse
history along with simulated MPD symptoms.110 The patient,
a 25-year-old woman, manifested regressive, childlike states
for which she claimed amnesia. She was given the diagnosis
of PTSD and MPD. Memory processing included frequent
attempts at abreaction, to which the patient failed to respond.
Then she reported a progressively complex ritual abuse his
tory, including allegations of 1 5-20 pregnancies. She also
reported that Satanic symbols had been carved on her body,
but she refused a medical examination that might have cor
roborated her report. She did not show PTSD symptoms upon
careful observation, and a subsequent physical examination
failed to reveal the alleged Satanic carvings. When con
fronted about these inconsistencies, she altered her story to fit
the data. A later careful review of her history "revealed lying,
stealing, and runaway behavior during her pre-teen years,
unproven accusations of paternal incest at age fifteen, and
withdrawal from school in the eleventh grade. The accusa
tions of incest began in the late 1 970s, when incest became a
popular topic. . . . The stories of S atanic abuse did not
begin until after she had observed the Geraldo Rivera televi
sion special on Satanism."\1l While Coons and Grier present
only a single case study, they note that such cases "will prob
ably become increasingly common as more victims of ritual
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abuse present for evaluation."112 Indeed, this may have been
the case in the 1 990s. Because of the rapid proliferation of a
professional and popular literature on ritual abuse in the
1 980s and early 1 990s, it could have been predicted that the
prevalence of factitious ritual abuse reports associated with
simulated MPD would dramatically increase by the early
1 990s. The Coons and Milstein data imply that by the late
1 990s one out of every ten patients presenting to a specialty
inpatient unit for dissociative disorders and diagnosed as
MPD was likely to have simulated MPD. Given this remark
able prevalence rate, it is noteworthy how difficult it has been
for clinicians to discriminate between simulated and genuine
MPD.
More recently, Ross developed a "four-pathway model" for
DID. According to this model, there are four independent
pathways contributing to the development of reported/mani
fested alter personality behavior and the range of clinical fea
tures characteristic of DID: ( 1 ) iatrogenic (created through
therapeutic suggestive influences), (2) factitious (self-gener
ated by the patient motivated by the need to adopt a sick
role), (3) created by trauma and abuse, and (4) created by
neglect. Ross acknowledges that at least some of the more
dramatic and fantastic cases of DID may be factitious disor
ders masquerading as DID-Le. , the simulation of DID
symptoms with no genuine alter behavior present. H e
observed that such patients have "no history of dissociative
symptoms prior to therapy, but there is usually an elaborate
medical-surgical history." He also noted that these patients
often "overfake" DID-for example, by getting extremely
high scores on the Dissociative Experiences Scale. Further
more, Ross observed that the presentations of factitious DID
may have changed since the mid-1 990s. He raised questions
about possible factitious false memory syndrome, in which
the patient first factitiously alleges that a former therapist(s)
suggestively implanted the DID symptoms, and then retracts
the abuse history and sues the therapist(s) . According to
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Ross, the current complex combination of primary and sec
ondary gain derived from factitious false memory syndrome
allegations in the context of a lawsuit, and reinforced by the
media and by false memory lawyers and their experts, is typi
cally far greater than the simple attention derived from adop
tion of a sick role with the former defendant clinician(s).113
In our own experience with dozens of false memory cases,
those DID patients with very flamboyant histories should be
scrutinized for possible factitious DID. Draijer and Boon, in
this issue, are the first to investigate factitious DID empiri
cally. Using a sensitive diagnostic instrument, the Structured
Clinical Interview for Diagnosis-Dissociative Disorders Ver
sion (SCID-D), to carefully differentiate between genuine
and simulated DID, they developed a list of differential crite
ria to distinguish between the two presentations. Hopefully,
based on sound empirical research of this type in the future,
clinicians will be in a better position to differentiate between
genuine and factitious DID presentations.
In our opinion, a major limitation of the pioneering work by
Coons, Kluft, Chu, Ross, and Draijer and Boon on factitious
DID is the either-or assumption inherent in some of this
work. These researchers have assumed that observed alter
personality behavior and other clinical features associated
with DID (e.g., disremembered experiences, time loss, etc.)
are either genuine or fabricated. In our view, except for Kluft
they have not adequately accounted for the possible co-exis
tence of a genuine major dissociative disorder and a factitious
embellishment of this disorder. In our own research, involv
ing careful examination of the medical records of dozens of
patients, we have found that the co-existence of a genuine
major dissociative disorder (DID or DDNOS) and factitious
embellishment of the dissociative condition is not infrequent,
at least in the 1 990s.
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7. Complex cases: multiple co-morbidities involving
factitious and dissociative combinations

In an important paper, Toth and Baggaley describe a single
case in which a chronic factitious disorder (Munchausen's
syndrome) and a genuine dissociative disorder (MPD/DID)
co-existed in the same patient.1I4 This patient also had a co
morbid borderline personality disorder diagnosis. The authors
trace the roots of the three conditions to a life-threatening ill
ness that began when the patient was three years old and later
resulted in a 1 0-month hospitalization, a prolonged recovery
time, and an extended period of sexual and physical abuse by
a male babysitter and a brother that began around age 5. Dur
ing the abuse, the patient learned to dissociate into an alter
personality who retained the abuse experiences compartmen
talized from the host personality. The patient experienced
progressive time loss, beginning in the second grade. Into
adulthood she experienced an impressive total of 58 medical
hospitalizations, mainly for factitious physical symptoms
such as fabricated head injuries, fevers, infections, anemia,
and urinary tract infections. She had accumulated 1 3 surgical
interventions for fictitious symptoms. Toth and B aggaley
believe that the prolonged illness and recovery contributed to
the development of the factitious behavior on the one hand,
and the childhood abuse contributed to the development of
the dissociative disorder on the other hand. They add, "The
caring received during the original hospitalization was likely
a much-needed respite from the home atmosphere [of abuse]
and served to engender a life-long habit of attempting to
return to that haven [through feigning illness]."lIs While the
authors believe this case represents the co-existence of gen
uine DID and factitious behavior, they also stipulate that it is
not entirely possible to rule out that the DID itself w as
another factitious creation.1I6
One other case of the possible co-existence of a factitious and
a dissociative disorder has been reported in the literature.
One of three cases reported by Popli et al. concerned a
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patient with voices, memory lapses, and seizures consistent
with a dissociative disorder diagnosis and also an uncorrobo
rated, and possibly fabricated, history of childhood sexual
and physical abuse, allegedly by a stepfather.117 Of course,
dissociative/factitious combinations can also involve genuine
and/or exaggerated suicidal and self-mutilatory behavior.
Such patients exaggerate self-destructive reports and behav
iors in order to maintain the sick role and prolong hospital
ization.1I8 Armstrong (this issue) presents a case report of a
woman treated for a major dissociative condition (DID) and a
self-reported trauma history who subsequently retracted both
her dissociative disorder diagnosis and her abuse history and
sued her therapists for allegedly implanting them. Armstrong
correctly emphasizes the factitious behavior throughout this
patient's history, co-existing with her presentation of disso
ciative symptoms, although Armstrong is skeptical as to
whether this patient ever had genuine DID.
We recently conducted a study of 3 1 retractors who became
plaintiffs in high-profile malpractice suits. 1I9 Most of these
retractors had recovered memories of childhood sexual and/or
physical abuse, and then ritual abuse, that they reported to
their therapists. Some years after a typically amicable termi
nation with the therapists, where the medical records usually
show substantial improvement with regard to the dissociative
disorder, these patients retracted the abuse memories and sub
sequently sued their therapists for malpractice. They alleged
that the earlier abuse reports were the product of therapeutic
influences that caused false memories of abuse to be sugges
tively implanted and resulted in a false DID diagnosis. In our
study, which we are completing for publication, we found,
from an examination of all of the available medical and legal
records, that each of these retractors exhibited genuine multi
ple co-morbid psychiatric diagnoses. Over 70% of the retrac
tors had a minimum of five major co-morbid psychiatric
diagnoses, which typically included ( 1 ) a major affective ill
ness, (2) PTSD, (3) DID or DDNOS, (4) a mixed personality
or borderline personality disorder, and (5) one or more addic-
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tive behaviors, such as chemical dependence, an eating disor
der, sexual compulsivity, or chronic self-mutilation. Addi
tional diagnoses in some of these retractors included a
somatoforrn disorder and some kind of anxiety diagnosis.
In addition to these genuine multiple co-morbid diagnoses,
we also found that an impressive 33% of the sample met the
criteria for a factitious disorder co-existing with a major dis
sociative disorder. These patients over several decades mani
fested a complex pattern of factitious medical symptoms and
syndromes, factitious psychiatric conditions, and factitious
victimization reports. A history of chronic lying was usually
present. These cases are important in that they show that mul
tiple combinations of genuine co-morbid psychiatric condi
tions involving trauma-related diagnoses (PTSD and DID or
DDNOS) and Axis II personality disorder diagnoses some
times co-exist with a chronic and progressive pattern of facti
tious behavior, and later with malingered behavior in the
context of malpractice litigation.
The typical course of such complex cases is that the PTSD
and DID or DDNOS symptoms emerge progressively over
time, concurrent with progressively more embellished
accounts of abuse, beginning with childhood abuse and
neglect, and progressing to bizarre accounts of ritual abuse,
human sacrifice and cannibalism. The dramatic nature of
these ritual-abuse reports raises the index of suspicion about
factitious behavior. This is not to say that genuine childhood
abuse may not have been operative in the development of at
least some portion of the adult psychopathological symptoms
in at least some of these cases. Putting aside the historical
truth of abuse, however, these cases definitely show a pattern
of factitious distortion and embellishment of the abuse
reports. For example, whenever the patient reports being a
"high priestess" in a Satanic ritual abuse cult, combined with
a long history of highly variable medical and psychiatric
complaints, a significant factitious contribution to the overall
complex illness pattern must be suspected. In our opinion, the

HeinOnline -- 27 J. Psychiatry & L. 401 1999

402

FACTITIOUS DISORDERS & TRAUMA-RELATED DIAGNOSES

motivation for these complex symptom presentations, along
with the fabricated and/or at least progressively embellished
personal abuse histories, is the need for attention from the
clinician. The DID patient with a bizarre and sensational cult
abuse story, who at one time alleged to be the "high priest" of
the cult, is much more likely to command the attention of the
therapist and/or the inpatient psychiatric nursing staff than
the DID patient with more common childhood abuse recollec
tions.
Such complex cases leave us with the thorny problem of
apportioning the relative contribution of genuine mUltiple co
morbid psychiatric diagnoses and factitious symptoms and
personal histories in the same patient. These cases illustrate
that in contrast to the data of Draijer and Boon reported in
this volume, the diagnosis of a major dissociative disorder
and a factitious disorder is sometimes not an either-or propo
sition. Draijer and Boon's discussion of "flamboyant DID" is
their way of acknowledging that such dissociative/factitious
disorder combinations also have been observed in their exten
sive research sample. Armstrong's case report in this issue
also leaves the reader with a question regarding the interrela
tionship between genuine dissociative symptoms and facti
tious behavior.
Furthermore, there is a complex relationship between facti
tiousness and borderline behavior. As we have observed in
recanters, as the dissociative disorder is addressed and
improves in treatment, additional pressure to maintain the
sick role is placed on the factitious disorder and additional
pressure to blame others and have others run their lives is
placed on borderline disorder. Thus it is sometimes the suc
cess of the treatment of the dissociation that invigorates facti
tiousness and borderline behavior and establishes the
preconditions for a malpractice lawsuit.
At the time these patients presented, in the late 1 980s and
early 1 990s, the stories they told about severe abuse, cults,
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etc., were reinforced by the media. Therapists were therefore
less likely to see the factitious disorder element. Furthermore,
the professional literature did not describe factitious aspects
of co-morbid diagnoses, and the limited categories in DSM
for factitious behavior would also have distracted well-mean
ing healers from understanding these complex cases. The
great tragedy is that over the last decade, as therapists have
struggled to learn how to treat these cases, the courts have
been holding them liable based on a standard of care that did
not exist then and is only starting to become clearer now.

8. Developmental perspectives: neglect, attachment
pathol ogy, and the learned development of
factitious behavior

Rogers et al. correctly criticize the DSM definition for its
lack of concern with the developmental pathology associated
with a factitious disorder:
[DSM-I/I] expresses a clear moral condemnation of this kind of
deceptive behavior. . . . In DSM-III, the diagnosis of deception is
totally in the foreground, whereas the patient' s disturbed relation
ship to his or her own body is entirely in the background . . . the
objective is to take on the role of patient . . . [what is neglected in
DSM-III is the] disturbed relationship to his or her own body, as
well as the disturbed doctor-patient relationship.120

We propose a three-factor model for the etiology of a facti
tious disorder. First, the roots of factitious behavior can be
traced to an early pattern of neglect or deprivation, which
sensitizes the child to a need for attention. Second, through
incidental learning, the developing child and later adult
specifically learns that sick-role behavior can be used to elicit
care-giving responses from health professionals initially.
Third, the socio-cultural context and the type of information
available to the factitious disorder patient serve to shape the
specific type of factitious behavior, be it simulated physical
symptoms, simulated psychological symptoms, false victim-
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ization stories, or a combination thereof. We will now more
closely examine each of these factors.
a. Neglect,
deprivation

& loss and
pervasive
develop
mental
deficits

There is a growing consensus that factitious disorders arise
from a "developmental disturbance" and that the relationships
factitious disorder patients develop with caregivers is a reen
actment of past developmental disturbances.121 The earliest
psychoanalytic descriptions of factitious behavior, originating
with Karl Abraham, stressed the "preoedipal deprivation"122
and "lack of parental affection" in the early childhood back
grounds of these patients. In Spiro, for example, wrote:
Early childhood deprivation and difficult relationships with aloof,
absent, or sadistic parents may sensitize the latter patients to dis
torted learning stemming from traumatic early illness or hospital
i zati o n . The concept of mastery . . . offers the most u seful
explanation for the subsequent behavior.124

Sometimes early loss, in addition to deprivation, contributes
to the development of factitious behavior. l25 Plassmann, for
example, sees factitious behavior as an "attempt to cope with
the early object losses in a narcissistic manner." In his sample
of 22 factitious disorder patients, 6 1 % had self-reported
attachment problems, 24% had rape histories, 19% had incest
histories, and 28% had suffered traumatic object los s .126
According to Nadelson, abnormal illness behavior arises
from fundamental problems in "attachment, bonding, and
caretaking."127 Those adult patients specifically presenting
with factitious PTSD "often have childhoods seriously lack
ing in parental affection."128
These early experiences of neglect, deprivation and/or loss
result in pervasive developmental arrests along the lines of
relational, self, and affect development. Long-lasting impair
ments in relational development or attachment pathology
(insecure attachment)129 arise from the neglect and loss. In a
study of seven factitious patients, for example, Carlson
noted:
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Marked defects in interpersonal relationships due to the observed
primary illness may help to explain their disorder. . . . It is felt
that the major factor contributing to the production of factitious
symptoms in these patients was a severe disturbance of interper
sonal relationships produced by the patients' primary iIInesses.
. . . The fabrication of symptoms may serve as a mechanism
whereby these individuals can temporarily relate to others, over
come their isolation, obtain caring, have certainty of their needs
being met, and possibly act out previous family dynamics.130

Nicholson and Roberts have reached a similar conclusion. In
their view of the etiology of the factitious disorder:
A general picture emerges in which patients come from disturbed
families and reach adulthood with a severely impaired ability to
form relationships, lifelong experience of emotional deprivation
and diagnosable personality disorder. Fabrication of mental illness
may be motivated by a need to seek compensation from sick role
benefits and relationships with mental health professionals.131

Another developmentally arrested line pertains to the sense of
self and the body self. An arrest in body image development
sensitizes the child to shifts in bodily states, and over time
the child learns to manipulate these states in the service of the
emerging factitious behavior:
. . . a pathology affecting the body self as well as a specific pathol
ogy in the doctor-patient relationship . . . these patients often have
an intimate knowledge of the manner in which their bodies react
and are thus able to discover possibilities for manipulation with
which the physician is normally unfamiliar . . . good and evil parts
of body as representations of negative portions of self.132

Arrested self and self-esteem development is a primary fea
ture of factitious behavior. In an important empirical study of
1 8 factitious disorder patients, Ehlers and Plassmann found
that nine had a co-existing borderline personality disorder
diagnosis and six had a co-existing narcissistic personality
disorder diagnosis. They found that 83% of patients in the
sample showed significant evidence for "disorders of self
regulation" and concluded: "The overwhelming majority of
patients suffering from factitious disorders therefore demon-
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strate a narcissistic pathology."133 This failure in self develop
ment results in several long-term consequences-an unstable,
protean sense of self and a vulnerability to self fragmenta
tion. Such self pathology may serve to explain why the facti
tious disorder patient can so easily assume very different
identities and personal histories over timel34 and why, funda
mentally, the factitious disorder patient's identity is that of an
imposter.135 Some experts have viewed factitious behavior as
an adaptive attempt to prevent total fragmentation of an
unstable sense of self by asserting and reinforcing false iden
tities.136
Affect development is also arrested in the factitious disorder
patient. According to Rodin, the factitious disorder patient's
preoccupation with bodily experience arises from a develop
mental deficit in "emotional awareness."137 These patients
have considerable difficulty with affective experience and
tolerance. According to Spivak et aI., they show an "incapac
ity to appraise what is real . . . can't experience inner affect
states as real . . . can't perceive emotion and perceptions as
real . . . [and have] uncertainty about the validity and conti
nuity of their own subjective experience.138
A related developmental deficit occurs with respect to the
development of reality perception and reality testing. Spivak
et al. explain:
[The factitious disorder patient] may suffer from underlying distur
bances in the sense of reality and in reality testing. These features
may be associated with a poorly consolidated sense of self and with
difficulty regarding emotional experience as real. Factitious behav
ior may serve to stabilize the sense of self by concretizing and
legitimizing the subjective experience of distress and by evoking
responsiveness of a caregiver in a relatively safe, structured con
text. . . . Two features that may be evident in patients with facti
tious disorders, but that are not explicitly noted in the DSM-IlI-R,
are disturbances in the sense of self and in the sense of reality. 139
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This developmental arrest in reality testing makes it difficult
for the factitious disorder patient to determine what is and is
not real. Pathological lying, a common symptom in factitious
disorder patients, may simply be a reflection of the factitious
disorder patient's inability to distinguish what is a subjec
tively created fabrication and what is objective reality. In this
sense, deceiving others may not be the primary intention of
the factitious disorder patient, but simply a by-product of a
fundamental inner confusion about what is real and what is
not. The description of abuse history and its later recantation
are similar instances of the inability to know what is reaL
b. Learning

Most experts concur that the developing pattern of factitious
behavior begins as a learned adaptive strategy to cope with
deprivation, loss, and the subsequent arrests across develop
mental lines. Early on in the process they learn to discern and
attempt to gain some control over internally shifting self
states, shifting bodily and affective states, and over the vicis
situdes of their connections to others and their reality sense.
Experience with childhood illnesses, especially if prolonged,
also contributes to the developing pattern. Factitious disorder
patients have been known to have an "early preoccupation
with health and i llnes s . " 14o Relations with health c are
providers in childhood are a critical factor in the developing
pattern, in that these patients learn that health care providers
readily give the kind of caring and nurturance that otherwise
are lacking. Cramer et al. say that "a central factor was the
relationship with physicians who had been important figures
in childhood." They add that it is perhaps no accident that a
good number of factitious disorder patients at one time or
another worked in the health field. As the direct recipients of
care-giving from health care providers or through observa
tions of others who receive such care, those who eventually
develop a factitious pattern have learned to associate health
care providers with receiving the kind of nurturance and
attention they desire.141
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In later childhood and adulthood, typically through contact ,
with the health care system, they learn that simulated behav
ior consistently elicits care-giving responses from health care
providers. Once this association is firmly established through
incidental l earning, they embark upon a progressively
learned, and ultimately compulsive, pattern of deceit and sim
ulated behavior targeted specifically at health care providers.
The fundamental motivation is based upon a "longing for
nurturance"142 and a "desire to be at the center of interest and
attention."143 On account of their failure in reality testing, fac
titious disorder patients usually show evidence of a long his
tory of pathological lying andlor antisocial behavior by late
childhood and adolescence.l44
Similar to addictive behaviors, such as alcoholism and drug
addiction, the learned factitious pattern eventually takes on a
life of its own-with progressive encroachment on the vari
ous areas of everyday life functioning, and the development
of a set of rationalizations to justify a pattern of simulated
behavior that is, at this point, compulsive. Now the factitious
disorder patient must continue the cycle of deceit even in the
face of greater disruption of daily life and greater potential
risks.
c. The
sociocultural
context

Nadelson said: "All [factitious disorder patients] have learned
such behavior in a culture."145 In this culture, assuming a
"sick role" is a legitimate way to exempt oneself of daily
responsibilities and still be lovingly cared for.146 Factitious
disorder patients learn that sick-role behavior directly grati
fies their longings for secure attachment. However, the ever
changing forms of factitious behavior also shift as popular
culture shifts. Popular culture in the 1 960s and 1 970s placed
the medical profession in high esteem, and it is perhaps no
accident that most of the case reports of that era were facti
tious disorder with physical symptoms. Popular culture and
media exposure in the 1 980s concerned themselves with post
traumatic stress disorder following the Vietnam War and with
the discovery of the prevalence and long-term effects of
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childhood abuse. Again, it is perhaps no accident that rela
tively new forms of factitious illness were increasingly
reported in this era, such as factitious PTSD, factitious MPD,
and factitious victimization. The popular culture of the late
1 980s and early 1 990s detailed gruesome accounts of severe
forms of abuse, such as extreme sadistic abuse and ritual
abuse. In this era, more complex forms of factitious illness
appeared, such as factitious DID and the co-existence of mul
tiple co-morbid real psychiatric conditions involving combi
nations of DID or DDNOS, a personality disorder, and
factitious embellishment of an alleged severe abuse history.
The popular culture of the mid-1 990s spread the idea of ther
apeutically implanted false memories, and with that, facti
tious retractor behavior increasingly found its way into the
courtroom. B ased on these shifting socio-cultural trends,
Feldman and Ford recommend that clinicians "take social cli
mates and world events into consideration" when evaluating
factitious presentations.147

9. Summary
•

The core feature of factitious illness is a systematic pat
tern of deceit and simulated behavior motivated by
attempts to adapt to developmental failures.

•

The DSM assumptions about exclusionary criteria,
especially with respect to genuine Axis I diagnoses, are
inadequate. The DSM fails to address with sufficient
specificity the co-existence of genuine psychiatric disor
ders and factitious behavior. Its criteria should explicitly
allow for the co-existence of a factitious disorder diagno
sis with other genuine psychiatric conditions, or at least
use the category of factitious behavior in association with
genuine psychiatric conditions.

•

By splitting hysteria asunder in DSM-III, the complex
interrelationship between dissociation disorders and facti-
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tious disorders was lost. The current DSM definition fails
to account for cases in which genuine DID or DDNOS
co-exists with factitious behavior, and it fails to address
with necessary precision the issue of totally factitious
DID.
•

The DSM conceptualization fails to show an appreciation
for the pervasive developmental deficits in attachment,
self, body-self, affect, and reality testing characteristic of
factitious behavior. These developmental deficits serve as
a plausible explanation for shifting self presentations,
manipulation and self-inflicted injury of the body, fabri
cated histories, and abuse reports that are impossible to
verify as true or false, and all these deficits are for the
sake of eliciting care-giving from health providers by
means of elaborate deceptions.

•

The forms of factitious disorder shift as the socio-cultural
context changes. In the 1 960s factitious illness was
observed with predominantly physical symptoms. In the
1 980s factitious illness with psychological symptoms
became increasingly prevalent. In the late 1 980s and
1 990s factitious victimization and personal histories, as
well as complex forms of factitious conditions combining
factitious physical and psychiatric symptoms with facti
tious personal histories and identities, with or within the
co-existence of genuine psychiatric conditions such as a
major dissociative disorder and a personality disorder,
were increasingly prevalent. The data that 1 0 % of all
inpatients diagnosed with DID may be simulating DID,
and that 3 3 % of patients diagnosed with genuine DID or
DDNOS may have significant factitious embellishment of
their symptoms and histories, are impressive, and such
data make a strong argument that both clinicians and
legal experts need to improve their skills for detecting
simulated DID.148
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•

Diagnostic nomenclature must account for the increasing
prevalence of factitious personal histories and identities,
not just factitious symptoms.

•

The interaction between popular culture exposure to, and
reports of, claims of extreme trauma and false memories
have given rise to complex factitious cases and factitious
retraction cases.

•

More recently, factitious false memory syndrome and fac
titious retractor behavior, either co-existing or not co
existing with genuine D ID or DDNOS, is becoming
increasingly prevalent. Factitious behavior is a more
plausible alternate explanation for plaintiff false memory
retraction lawsuits than the iatrogenesis explanation,
especially given the data that one out of ten inpatients
diagnosed with DID is simulating and one out of three
patients with genuine DID or DDNOS also has a signifi
cant factitious symptom and fabricated/embellished per
sonal history presentation. These complex and factitious
retraction cases increasingly are making their way into
the courts, where the great need for attention is com
pounded by potential external monetary incentives. Here
factitious behavior and malingering may overlap. The
courts have been as ill-equipped to detect factitious
behavior as the clinics have been.

•

All experts concur that factitious behavior, especially in
its psychological forms, is very difficult to detect.149 Clin
icians are not, and should not be, trained to be detec
tives, ISO and they rarely receive training in the highly
specialized areas of detecting malingering and deceit. The
entire foundation of the doctor-patient relationship is
based on the patient telling the truth about his or her
symptoms. The doctor's duty to provide care is most
effective when matched by the patient's duty to act in
good faith in accurately presenting symptoms and a
history.
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Factitious behavior is a pattern of systematic deception
that arises within the patient. The courts must develop an
increased sensitivity to the contribution that factitious and
borderline mental disorders, coupled with post-therapeu
tic suggestive influences, have played in the filing of
false memory complaints against healers. The courts must
now determine the relative responsibility and duty the
doctor owes to the deceptive patient who enters the legal
system essentially saying "You are liable because you
believed me."

•
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